

# Transformation Under Attack

**Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, U.S. Army, Retired**

THE U.S. ARMY TODAY is fully engaged in Transformation on a scale that is not unlike the Army's successful rebuilding after the Vietnam war that culminated after Operation Desert Storm. At that time, the essential challenge was maintaining readiness to defeat the Warsaw Pact while rebuilding the Army. This post-Vietnam change was fundamentally linear. There were no basic surprises in doctrine, organization, equipment, or materiel. They were more or less simply improvements to what had won World War II.

Not so today. Now a second Transformation proceeds. This Transformation faces two tasks simultaneously: responding to evolving conventional threats and novel asymmetric attacks both at home and abroad, and transforming the Army's conventional forces to conduct substantially different joint and combined operations in the future. Success in the second Transformation poses several interrelated requirements that must be mastered simultaneously. Separately, each of these requirements is a significant challenge for U.S. land power. Together, they pose a formidable challenge, greater than those the Army faced in the post-Vietnam transformation. The new requirements follow:

- Sustain the abiding characteristics of America's Army.
- Regenerate the Army's current quality land power capability, which has been impaired by a decade of resource anemia. There is an abiding need to repair a decade of consumed capability with scant regeneration. Significant seed corn has been consumed.
- Adapt rapidly to defeat terrorism globally in a campaign that promises to be years, if not decades, long.<sup>1</sup>
- Sustain and probably accelerate current Transformation programs.
- Maintain a substantial general conventional mobilization capability to shift from a quality to a quantity military force.

None of these is a showstopper in itself, but each needs to be weighed in combination and incorpo-

rated in adjusting to Transformation under attack, a transformation taking place in the aftermath of the Cold War and 11 September 2001. All that the Army accomplishes is achieved as America's Army—land power molded by a unique combina-

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tion of requirements in the United States as a democracy, a nation, a state, a federal republic, and a continent.<sup>2</sup> These requirements generate certain development imperatives. They will be mandated by legislative oversight should executive direction be absent. They are absolutely prescriptive in channeling the energies of Transformation. The nation neglects them at its peril.

Transformation must overcome the burdens caused by a decade of underresourcing. The transformation following Vietnam instilled individual and unit proficiency defined by task, condition, and standard. This proficiency was proofed in quasi-combat at the combat training centers (CTCs). No Army has ever known in such detail what is required to be combat-ready. This knowledge and readiness stands in contrast to what is occurring in many units today stressed by intense commitment, personnel instability, and insufficient home station training opportunities. General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, (CSA) in the mid-1990s, warned for years that inadequate resources were causing the Army to put the horse away wet.

Despite notable efforts emerging to rebuild equipment, the psychology of a decade of drawdown endures. The consequences of this psychology are aging legacy forces, disturbing leader attrition, and

seriously questioning the professional ethos. All these combine to moderate the institution's responsiveness.<sup>3</sup> The Army has experienced this sort of ennui before, most recently in the early 1970s, when pundits moped that the Army was on an inevitable decline evidenced by contraction from 13 to 10 or fewer divisions. Then CSA Creighton W. Abrams

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successfully reversed the psychological gloom by mandating the Army's expansion to 16 divisions. Countering reactive dismay today is not an insurmountable problem, but it requires constant attention in a force that should rightfully consider itself to be the premier quality Army in the world.

Preeminence of quality not quantity poses another problem. Potential major-power competitors with sizable and improving armies are out there. Prudence and effective deterrence dictate that the nation maintain the ability to expand its Army rapidly through massive World War II-like mobilization. In such an expansion, the Army shifts its reliance on quality forces to relying on quantity forces. Credible expansion hedges—policies or programs required to restore a known deficiency in ready military capability—across each doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) imperative are required.

An overarching strategic imperative is constituting the Army philosophically and practically so it can “turn on a dime” to meet threats across the spectrum of conflict, from global world war to isolated instances of asymmetric terrorism. Such a capability is akin to maintaining robust health while containing a dangerous, long-term infection that affects both domestic security and international security interests. While advancing on multiple fronts for a prolonged period is challenging, the difficulty can be eased by leveraging two important military organizations—the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Special Operations Command (SOCOM)—and by drawing on the boundless potential of the Army National Guard

(ARNG), the nation's traditional hedge against a small standing army or the requirement for a large army as was needed for World Wars I and II. Doing so exploits the abiding strengths of America's Army. A skillful combination of policies and programs using these three sources should respond fully to the challenge.

TRADOC is institutionalizing balanced service support to regenerate and rebuild existing forces and develop future forces. For almost 3 decades, TRADOC has been a proven incubator of innovation. To those roles now add the overwatch of mobilization hedges—spiral support of the six DTLOMS imperatives, from Objective to Interim to Legacy to hedge forces.<sup>4</sup> Transformation becomes continuously exploiting the unique advantages of America's Army. SOCOM possesses highly credible, mission-focused, joint unit excellence. It demonstrates extraordinary innovation and competence in fighting state terrorism. Elite forces mounted on Afghan horses directing precision munitions are just the tip of the iceberg of the highly adaptive tactical innovation SOCOM forces have achieved. The ARNG is the land power muscle that reinforces state and local authority to achieve homeland defense, all the while reinforcing standing federal land power as it transforms.

TRADOC, SOCOM, and the ARNG can be the vital enablers of Transformation. TRADOC ensures DTLOMS-balanced land power prepared for conventional and asymmetric conflict from objective forces to hedges. SOCOM effectively shapes new joint warfighting capabilities. The ARNG strengthens homeland defense in conjunction with federal, state, and local authorities.<sup>5</sup> The Army—Active component (AC), Reserve component (RC), and ARNG—operates globally in joint and multinational coalitions to defeat terrorism in all its forms.

## **TRADOC**

TRADOC is the guardian for the integrated development of the six DTLOMS imperatives and the vehicle for hedge capability assimilation. TRADOC's authority to assign responsibility and authority to organizations to balance development enables DTLOMS' horizontal coordination to take place across commands. This focus, when tied to the CTCs' mission to “test, fix, test” in the caldron of quasi-combat, serves both evolutionary and revolutionary spiral development. Together, TRADOC training centers and CTCs become the wellspring of tactical innovation, an innovation that has been proven most recently by the successes of digitization through Army warfighting experiments and the interim brigade effort. Among other things, this organizational precedent among armies globally can provide—

Leaders and staff reconnoiter the terrain during a training exercise. Planning groups such as this are the precursor to leader teams that may supplant individual commanders to lead units that are increasingly interagency and multicultural.

US Army

***Increasingly, teams of leaders dominate effective C2. This is predictable with the advent of near-revolutionary impacts of vast improvements in leader communication capabilities. The next breakthrough in C2 is likely to be improving Army unit leader teams into high-performing, joint and combined, cross-cultural leader teams. . . . All Objective Force-level capabilities could be designed to plug in to strike forces to provide the niche-dominating combination of BOS appropriate to any particular military force requirement across the spectrum of conflict, conventional to asymmetric.***

- Intensive research, development, test, and evaluation in each Army area of Title 10 responsibility.

- Leader and leader team education and training directly focused on leading edge warfighting. Preparing highly proficient individual leaders is no longer sufficient. Increasingly, teams of leaders dominate effective command and control (C2). This is predictable with the advent of near-revolutionary impacts of vast improvements in leader communication capabilities. The next breakthrough in C2 is likely to be improving Army unit leader teams into high-performing, joint and combined, cross-cultural leader teams.

- Sustained quasi-combat learning experiences for all commissioned and noncommissioned officer leaders (AC/RC)—the original purpose of the National Training Center.

TRADOC can continually provide proven state-of-the-art DTLOMS for the current Objective, Interim, and Legacy Forces as well as maintain hedge capability from quality to quantity capabilities in each aspect of DTLOMS. In effect, TRADOC is the Transformation center of gravity, nurturing the rebuilding of the Legacy Force from reactive anemia to proactive

initiative, a function comparable to what TRADOC accomplished for the entire Army after Vietnam.

TRADOC can enable hedges while focusing responsive futures development. The primary vehicle for futures is the AC; for hedges, the RC. In effect, TRADOC becomes the guardian, and professional conscience, for the various 5- or 10-year rules implied in all hedge strategies.<sup>6</sup> Simultaneously, TRADOC can focus DTLOMS-integrated support to land power fighting terrorism such as doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (DTTP) for rapid leader team building across multiple multinational organizations or effective doctrine for global counterterrorism, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The same can be provided for the various National Guards responding to their particular states' often unique security needs.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, TRADOC serves as the sparkplug for revitalized professionalism by significantly improving the professional development of leaders and leader teams. Leader traits can be instilled at the institution, cultivated while in TRADOC-supported units via distance learning, and brought to fruition in the experiential learning environments of the CTCs.

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## SOCOM

Since Vietnam, Army support to special operational forces has added tremendous versatility to the battlefield operating system (BOS) of maneuver. The Army's commitment to light, flexible maneuver forces is apparent in creating the light infantry division (LID), standing up a third Ranger battalion and a Ranger regimental headquarters, and establishing the Delta Force. A model of cascading excellence is evident in the relationship among these organizations. That is, when compared to each other, these units reveal an increased refinement of capability within the maneuver BOS. Each of the six DTLOMS imperatives is improved when it moves from one of these ground maneuver organizations to the next—from LID to Ranger or from Ranger to Delta. Specifically, improvements follow:

- Increasing leader and leader team competence through intensified training.
- Adjusting assignment policies to sustain the excellence of a particular subordinate unit's mission performance such as stabilizing leader teams through repetitive regimental or squadron assignments.
- Highly selective leader accession policies.<sup>8</sup>
- Accelerating acquisition of the most recent equipment and materiel through direct coordination with research and development (R&D) organizations.
- Flexible organizational frameworks that are responsive to the immediate tactical situation.

Add other types of infantry, such as mounted, parachute, or air assault, to this combination and one might view the U.S. infantry's evolution as a spiral of increasing competence and capability. It is a useful and practical example of maintaining infantry capability from hedge (RC-ARNG infantry units) to Objective Force (SOCOM—Ranger, Special Forces, Delta, and similar organizations). The implications of the force development of the traditional compositions of U.S. infantry are impor-

tant to the future of all BOS.

This pattern of increased excellence culminating in SOCOM joint attack forces could establish the pattern for the Objective Force's core capabilities—strike forces, units of action, or whatever name the Army's senior leadership decides. That is, brigade-sized organizations, positioned globally, will be ready for rapid commitment as part of a joint force across the spectrum of likely conflict. These forces seem likely to be oriented toward counterterrorism initially.<sup>9</sup> Now apply similar cascading excellence to other BOS:

**Fire support.** Tailored warheads, precision guidance, space sensors, and a wide range of effects will evolve. The scope includes much expanded target acquisition through tactical to strategic unmanned aerial vehicles, improved passive (undetectable) target acquisition, and multiple-path access to air power such as was demonstrated very effectively with B-52s and joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) in the recent Afghan campaign.

Flexibility in means extends to the nature of the munitions themselves. Extraordinary precision of air power delivery of current high-explosive munitions approaches the battlefield effects of small tactical nuclear weapons. Munitions alternatives should include wide variations in lethality. Improved fire support should be nonlethal as well as lethal across the range of potential weapons. Current constraints notwithstanding, nonlethal biological and chemical weapons (disabling but not lethal) might be exceedingly useful fire support capabilities when conflict moves into urban areas.

**Combat service support (CSS).** Logistics will incorporate such efficiencies as reducing supply requirements; inventorying in motion from the continental United States to consuming military units; and significantly reducing daily force sustainment requirements for petroleum, oils, and lubricants; ammunition; and spares. Leading edge civilian-related logistics capabilities are maintained in each area of competence. USAR capability, maintained at the forefront of U.S. commercial state-of-the-art logistics, would support strike forces.

**Intelligence.** Formerly, intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) at each echelon focused initially on supporting traditional land power warfighting. Contemporary IEW, in conjunction with other U.S. and multinational intelligence organizations, provides highly responsive intelligence support to local political, military, and law enforcement organizations fighting terrorist threats and to conventional mid-intensity tactical operations. For example, there should be expanded links to state and local intelligence organizations to provide timely, quality intelligence support to ARNG units that are committed to state homeland defense missions.

**C2.** The best C2 would consist of creating and sustaining highly proficient leader teams drawn from the variety of military and civilian organizations and cultures that need to be synchronized to defeat terrorist organizations employing WMD. For international terrorism, these teams could be composed locally to meld the direction of diverse organizations. For homeland defense, the various state ARNGs would support similar municipal, county, or state counterterrorist organizations formed by respective executive authority.

Note the emphasis on leader teams, not solely on individuals. Preparing highly proficient individual leaders is no longer sufficient. Increasingly, teams of leaders dominate effective C2. This is predictable with the advent of near-revolutionary impacts of vast improvements in leader communication capabilities. The next breakthrough in C2 is likely to be extension of improving Army unit leader team creation into high-performing, joint and combined, cross-cultural leader teams. All Objective Force-level capabilities could be designed to plug in to strike forces to provide the niche-dominating combination of BOS appropriate to any particular military force requirement across the spectrum of conflict, conventional to asymmetric. Often, the composition will change as the fight progresses. Those are the roots of the evolving Army requirement for highly adaptive, self-aware leaders and leader teams at all echelons.

Each BOS would maintain Objective, Interim, and Legacy Forces and would support such parallel capabilities that might be essential to support multispectrum operations of all kinds. New BOS might emerge. Examples of newly emerged BOS could include information operations, negotiations, multicultural team building, or terrorist neutralization operations. New multispectrum DTTP will be required for each new BOS:

- Objective Forces are the best of the best—extraordinary quality.
- Interim Forces are experimental, preparing with CTCs and the R&D community for the next Objective Force.
- Legacy Forces are the Objective Force of 20 to 40 years ago, with Legacy likely to be the high end of the hedge force. That is the expansion base for building the hedge to mobilization quantity in each BOS.<sup>10</sup>

## Combining SOCOMs and TRADOCs Strengths

Both SOCOM and TRADOC are important organizational initiatives, but how could they combine to create a whole that is much greater than the mere sum of the parts? How would these concepts combine to translate to relevant new capabilities? How

much introduction of what at each echelon, when?

To organize its objective forces, the Army must use organizational principles that are different from those used to design legacy ground maneuver organizations.<sup>11</sup> The basic legacy practice used the

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maneuver battalion as the basic building block around which were organized routinely other combat, combat support, and CSS functions. This must change. The Army should incorporate an organizational structure of core fighting teams similar to the Delta Force troop-level organization with multiples of four to six leader teams (E4 and above). These comprise cohesive core fighting teams to which additional capabilities can be added as required to form a unit of action—the squadron or battalion. The squadrons and/or battalions combine to form the regiment or brigade, which is joint and potentially combined, to become the next higher echelon. The essential organizational characteristic should be common DTTP and personal communications capability for all soldiers. These two characteristics would enable the organizations to respond easily to change; that is, the demonstrated ability to change rapidly, to respond to new opportunities or new dangers, conventional or asymmetric.

The Army needs highly variable organizations. When added to core fighting teams, AC, RC, civilian, and contract personnel provide highly competent, cohesive teams organized by BOS. The teams must establish habitual associations to form and sustain high performance. Furthermore, plug ins would support these teams according to their mission requirements. Clearly, further R&D is required to reduce significantly the time required to form highly competent, cohesive leader teams at all echelons, across BOS cultures.

Creating high-performing leader teams will be the next breakthrough in leader development. Such leader teams are particularly useful in asymmetric operations. For example, a critical counterterrorist offensive capability will be the ability to create



rapidly—in hours, not days or weeks—high-performing, multi-BOS, multicultural leader teams that lead both vertically and horizontally. Teams should be able to rapidly adjust their composition to stay ahead of local terrorist cells that will continually change their methods of operation to remain effective. The issue is providing highly proficient teams composed of individuals with the greatest conceivable power to influence the local counterterrorist

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situation. The major challenge is not to modify the performance of all-purpose groups to dominate a local situation. Rather, it is to bring together the precise expertise required to dominate the local situation, or niche, and to rapidly create a high-performance team built around those dominating capabilities. The ability to effect rapid cross-cultural leader bonding in ad hoc, hybrid military and civilian organizations would be a national asset comparable to stealth or network operations.

Upon mobilization, or upon activating the hedge, land power must shift to a mass-production mode to amass the quantities of forces typically associated with conventional world war. There will likely be a substantial shift from quality to quantity—a more but “less better” situation. Therefore, there is a requirement to maintain a substantial military unit production base that can expand across combat, combat support, and CSS functions quickly.<sup>12</sup> This production base would be the Legacy Force.

I suggest several standing corps-sized forces, both mounted and light, that will maintain the wide range of task proficiencies and synchronization skills associated with a quantity force. More critically, they would provide a capability that could immediately address a 1+ major regional contingency above and beyond the international counterterrorist requirements for the Army. That force would not include substantial ARNG forces because they would be required to sustain homeland defense. Moreover, prudence dictates that the ARNG homeland defense capability should be

available to state governors to augment and reinforce existing state security resources.

These several standing, largely AC, Army corps include leading edge, quality objective forces that provide BOS augmentation across the mission spectrum to the strike forces.<sup>13</sup> The corps maintain competencies associated with theater army combat support and CSS units. Conventional warfighting DTTP require these competencies to conduct mid-intensity operations. These competencies are the mark on the wall for RC forces not associated with homeland defense that become the hedge land power capability when they are mobilized. That is, the corps will maintain essential warfighting competencies that will be immediately available for missions, plus provide seed corn examples of proficiency required of hedge capabilities as they are constituted.

Consider the corps forces as legacy “lehr” units for maintaining Regular Army quality competence to infuse into newly created units during mobilization. This implies maintaining the RC even more than in the past as the expansion mobilization base—sufficiently credible to keep coalitions of land power opponents from forming. Sustaining highly capable counterterrorist forces plus highly credible hedges becomes a new aspect of military deterrence. These forces’ actual competence and deterrent credibility would be sustained by a substantially larger TRADOC charged with maintaining cutting edge global dominance in each of the six DTLOMS imperatives.

### **Employing the Objective Force in Counterterrorism Operations**

Continuing terrorism today is the most likely near-term threat to national security. SOCOM+ is maintained as the joint Objective Force, the leading edge of all six DTLOMS imperatives. Therefore, counterterrorism capability should follow the SOCOM quality precedent. When supported by each of the services—land, sea, and air—SOCOM becomes SOCOM+ and establishes the mark on the wall for future international counterterrorism operations. Following is a hypothetical situation in which, in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Army could employ its counterterrorism force.<sup>14</sup>

Counterterrorist forces (Delta Force) and direct-action forces (the Ranger regiment) supported by appropriate service units all form into highly proficient land, sea, air teams; deploy to a theater to kill terrorists; and destroy their enabling infrastructure. Ideally, SOCOM+ is augmented by indigenous host nation counterterrorist organizations. Simultaneously, joint SOCOM teams augmented by other

U.S. security and intelligence organizations bring together local leaders from various organizations—civilian, military, private volunteer organizations, nongovernment organizations, economic, and religious—into high-performing counterterrorist leader teams. These leaders have the competence and authority to modify policies and programs, as required, to gain and maintain the initiative against local terrorist cells.

SOCOM+ leaders are trained to develop and sustain local leader teams. Weapons would consist of nonlethal weapons, then lethal—all brilliant munitions—as required. Leader teams would be able to draw on, as needed, a precise combination of land, sea, and air capabilities—arrows in the quiver—to dominate particular terrorist situations. These teams would receive reinforcing national assets through the U.S. ambassador and the appropriate military command authority. Ideally, a substantial part of the combat force would come from allies. The objective is to achieve local diversity that reflects the local population so that local security organizations representative of local cultures—ethnic, religious, and so forth—are at the cutting edge. These could be augmented by Special Forces, Ranger, or Delta Force-type personnel.

SOCOM+ is elite in every respect. It consists of extraordinarily competent, high-performing teams with capabilities maintained across all BOS. This capability could be provided by the Objective Force

strike forces. Sustaining extraordinary cross-BOS excellence is the services' Title 10 responsibility. For the Army, it is TRADOC's major responsibility to provide intensive leader development, unit training, proven DTTP, and proven organizational configurations appropriate for multinational, multiservice, multicivilian organizations like early strike force concepts.

This vision, enabled in time for Legacy Forces, will also rebuild the proactive professional ethos that has characterized the U.S. Army in the past. It is a vision of extraordinary professional excellence across the breadth of America's Army. Comparable leader teams would support homeland defense within the United States. Each state's ARNG would provide the military expertise under the governor's command. The Active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve would provide such support to the ARNG. New authorities, responsibilities, and associated resources will be required to support the ARNG in its enlarged role in America's Army.

These are challenging times. Fortunately, America's Army is ready. Institutionalizing processes of adjustment represented by TRADOC and SOCOM ensures timely, appropriate responses to evolving challenges to our great nation. The ARNG knows the path; it lacks only resources. With shared determination, Transformation under attack will be Transformation accelerated. The necessary tools and will are present. **MR**

## NOTES

1. Terrorism as manifested 11 September 2001 through subverting artifacts of advanced civilization (transport aircraft and skyscrapers) as well as using WMD.
2. General Gordon R. Sullivan, U.S. Army, Retired, and Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, U.S. Army, Retired, "America's Army," *Military Review* (March-April 2002), 3-8.
3. All an unfortunate aftermath of a superb post-Cold War drawdown former CSA Carl Vuono initiated, was executed through and beyond Operation Desert Storm, and then CSA Gordon R. Sullivan completed. Superbly executed with exceptional congressional support, years of reductions in force and shortfalls nonetheless generate their own atmosphere of decline.
4. No explicit tie is intended to the current Objective, Interim, and Legacy Forces that will and should all evolve. Whatever terms future leadership may wish to employ, the necessary forces are future (visionary), experimental, and present forces. All three must be addressed plus a credible hedge capability link to quantify forces generated after extensive mobilization.
5. The Reserve forces are being asked to do more and more but at what cost to the essential ethos of citizen-soldiers—vital members of America's Army? How much time can you devote to the U.S. Army Reserve or ARNG and continue to maintain a civilian job? Overemphasis on using Reserve forces, however capable they are, is an example of seed corn consumption with serious detrimental long-term implications.
6. Time periods a national authority establishes as the expected lead time to rebuild capability once a peer competitor emerges.
7. It should be noted that the ARNG leadership most appropriate for homeland defense is The Adjutants General political leadership the governor selects as a political act, not necessarily the line ARNG leaders selected based on their demonstrated competence in leading warfighting units. This is an excellent example of the diverse capabilities built into America's Army.
8. Special Forces' leader accession measures the Army Research Institute developed have proven to be exceptionally valid—a major human factors R&D success. A snapshot of the extraordinary cascading excellence of U.S. Army Special Operations Command and Joint Special Operations Command leaders was represented in the service of Sergeant First Class (SFC) Nathan Chapman who was killed in Afghanistan. Within hours, President George W. Bush and the na-

- tional media lauded him and his young family. His parents, proud of his service amid their grief, were on video extolling him and military service in general. It would be hard to imagine either a more effective soldier (proud to be an American) or a more eloquent strategic media effort portraying the best of service to nation. If the B-52 JDM guided by horse-mounted special operations soldiers was one breakthrough in combat from Afghan combat, the national pride evoked by SFC Chapman's selfless service that the media transmitted globally was another breakthrough. In life or death, superb American soldiers, as individuals, are national strategic assets as they portray America as it wishes to be to self and to the world.
9. No particular organizational design is suggested, although the case for accelerated Transformation within existing capabilities is compelling. See Douglas A. Macgregor, "Resurrecting Transformation: A New Structure for Post-Industrial Warfare," *Defense Horizons* (September 2001).
10. It seems likely that a hierarchy of capabilities from objective to interim to legacy will influence counterterrorist operations also. Highest priority U.S. states or multinational regions would receive priority for the best Federal objective capabilities. Each state ARNG could be expected to strive for the best—a healthy, beneficial competition.
11. Interim Forces design would be derivative of anticipated Objective Force capabilities for each BOS in a process of unending spiral development.
12. Base realignment and closure should accommodate quantity force-generation requirements. Closures are clearly necessary but not to the point of gutting hedge mobilization capabilities that are clearly integral to land power deterrence of likely peer competitors, like the training base.
13. The combination of Objective and Legacy Forces—conventional and counterterrorist—should be sufficient to satisfy land power requirements for at least two conventional major regional contingencies if those contingencies remain a relevant capability measure.
14. Joint and combined performance in Afghanistan has been remarkable. The rate of force development foreseen in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm a decade ago has clearly accelerated. Actual performance is much closer to a hypothetical conceptual framework than I would have considered feasible before autumn 2001.

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